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Policymakers  in  developing  countries  have  increasingly  pinned  their  hopes  on  bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) in order to improve their chances in the worldwide competition for 
foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the effectiveness of BITs in inducing higher FDI 
inflows is still open to debate. It is in several ways that we attempt to clarify the inconclusive 
empirical  findings  of  earlier  studies.  We  cover  a  much  larger  sample  of  host  and  source 
countries  by  drawing  on  a  previously  unpublished  dataset  on  bilateral  FDI  flows. 
Furthermore, we account for unilateral FDI liberalization, in order not to overestimate the 
effect of BITs, as well as for the potential endogeneity of BITs. Employing a gravity-type 
model and various model specifications, including an instrumental variable approach, we find 
that BITs do promote FDI flows to developing countries. In addition, BITs are likely to act as 
a substitute for unilateral capital account liberalization. 
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1.  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are widely perceived to be superior to other types of 
capital  inflows.  Apart  from  offering  additional  investment  resources,  FDI  may  help  host 
countries  foster  economic  development  by  offering  access  to  internationally  available 
technologies and managerial know-how, rendering it easier for the host countries to penetrate 
foreign markets, and making them less prone to sudden reversal of flows in times of crisis. At 
the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, 
Heads of State and Government propagated the view that FDI provides an important means to 
eradicate poverty in developing countries. According to the Monterrey Consensus, the central 
challenge is to overcome the concentration of FDI in few (large and relatively advanced) 
developing countries so that poor countries would be able to reap the benefits of FDI (UN 
2002). 
Hence, it is not surprising that policymakers in almost all countries are engaged in 
fierce competition for FDI inflows. However, it has remained disputed as to how effective the 
means are that national policymakers have at their disposal when attempting to attract FDI. 
Major driving forces of FDI (e.g., the size and development of host country markets, the 
endowment of local factors of production, and geographical and cultural proximity to major 
source countries) are largely beyond the realm of short-term policymaking. This may explain 
why policymakers have increasingly pinned their hopes on two sets of measures: (i) unilateral 
regulatory  changes  and  incentives  such  as  opening  up  previously  restricted  industries, 
removing foreign ownership restrictions, promotional efforts, and tax and fiscal inducements; 
and (ii) bilateral agreements through which host country governments commit themselves to 
binding obligations, e.g., concerning the entry of foreign investors, post-entry regulations, 
profit remittances and dispute settlement. 
In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in 
stimulating additional FDI inflows. The few empirical studies addressing this question have 
produced highly ambiguous results (Section 2). We suspect that this is at least partly due to 
the fairly small sample of host countries covered by most previous studies. We make use of 
the  extensive  data  on  bilateral  FDI  flows  collected  by  UNCTAD  (which  is  largely 
unpublished, but available from its Data Extract Service). In this way, we avoid a sample 
selection bias which is likely to arise when the sample is restricted to relatively advanced host 
countries. Moreover, this paper is the first to address the issue of isolating the effects of BITs 




After reviewing the results obtained by previous studies in Section 2, we next illustrate 
some stylized facts on both BITs and unilateral measures to liberalize the capital account in 
Section 3. The gravity-type model applied is presented in Section 4, where we also discuss 
methodological choices (notably the use of bilateral FDI flows, compared to a non-dyadic 
approach) as well as the data employed. Section 5 reports our main results. We find that BITs 
are  effective  in  promoting  FDI  inflows  and  may  even  act  as  a  substitute  for  unilateral 
measures to promote FDI. Various robustness checks are carried out in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes.  
 
2.  Analytical and Empirical Background 
More than 20 years ago, Schneider and Frey (1985) found it surprising that two strands of the 
literature on the determinants of FDI had developed quite separately from each other: Studies 
stressing political factors had largely neglected economic factors, whereas studies stressing 
economic factors had largely neglected political factors. A similar dichotomy can still be 
observed even though the call by Schneider and Frey for  a politico-economic model that 
accounts for both economic and political determinants is fairly common by now. 
What  recent  studies  tend  to  ignore  is  that  policymakers  in  various  countries  have 
resorted to two sets of measures to attract more FDI inflows: (i) unilateral, i.e., non-binding 
changes in FDI-related regulations, most of which amount to a more favorable treatment of 
FDI, and (ii) bilateral (as well as plurilateral) treaties in which host countries have committed 
themselves  in  a  legally  binding  way  to  grant  foreign  investors  various  rights  that  reduce 
uncertainty with respect to entry and exit conditions, post-entry operations as well as dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
Several empirical analyses focus on unilateral measures. Examples include Gastanaga 
et al. (1998), Asiedu and Lien (2004), Asiedu (2005), Pica and Rodríguez Mora (2005), and 
Desai et al. (2006). Gastanaga and Associates examine the effects of various policy measures 
on FDI flows, including the role of investment regulations. They employ two indicators of the 
degree of openness to international capital flows, both of which are constructed from the 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions. Less restrictive capital 
controls  are  typically  associated  with  higher  FDI  inflows  (pooled  data  for  49  developing 
countries in the period 1970-1995). Asiedu and Lien (2004) refer to the same source, but 
consider  three  types  of  controls  (multiple  exchange  rates,  controls  on  capital  account 
transactions,  and  controls  with  regard  to  export  proceeds)  for  a  broader  panel  of  96 




statistically significant; the absence of controls on capital account transactions increases the 
ratio of FDI to GDP by about 0.6 percent. In a paper on FDI in Africa, Asiedu (2005) refers to 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to assess the host countries’ attitude towards 
inward  FDI.  The  ICRG  index  comprises  four  components:  risk  of  operations,  taxation, 
repatriation of profits, and labor costs. Lagged openness to FDI according to this index is 
shown to have positive effects on FDI in Africa. However, the coverage of this index extends 
well beyond capital account restrictions. The same applies to the measures of “regulatory 
distance” employed by Pica and Rodríguez Mora (2005),
1 which they find to be negatively 
related  to  bilateral  FDI  flows.  By  contrast,  Desai  et  al.  (2006)  focus  on  a  more  specific 
measure than the  IMF’s overall assessment of capital controls, i.e., restrictions on capital 
repatriation  and  profit  remittances  as  provided  by  Shatz  (2000).  When  using  this  more 
specific measure, the negative effects of  capital controls on FDI by  US-based companies 
become stronger. 
The few studies addressing the question whether the recent surge of BITs has helped 
host  countries  to  attract  more  FDI  typically  do  not  take  into  account  that  unilateral 
liberalization  of  FDI  regulations  has  proceeded  at  the  same  time.  When  discussed  at  all, 
unilateral measures are discounted as non-binding (e.g., Neumayer and Spess 2005). This 
reasoning is based on the presumption that bilateral contractual arrangements, in contrast to 
unilateral  measures,  provide  a  credible  commitment  through  which  time-inconsistency 
problems can be overcome (e.g., Vandevelde 1998; Hallward-Driemeier 2003; Elkins et al. 
2006). Non-binding unilateral measures would be time inconsistent if the host country had an 
incentive to renege on earlier promises after the investment has been made.  
Yet it is open to question whether the commitment through BITs is more effective than 
unilateral liberalization. Theoretically, BITs would clearly be superior if attracting FDI were a 
one-time game. The host country could then easily renege on unilateral promises with regard 
to the treatment of FDI once the foreign investor realized the sunk costs associated with 
locating in the host country. In reality, however, attracting FDI amounts to a repeated game in 
which the host country strives for a continuous stream of FDI inflow from investors observing 
its behavior in the past. In other words, reversing unilateral liberalization once some FDI is 
“locked in” would come at the cost of deterring future inflows. Moreover, Vandevelde (1998) 
argues that the bilateral commitment is often of limited value as BITs constitute “only a small 
part  of  a  liberal  investment  regime”  (page  515)  and  “allow  the  host  state  considerable 
                                                            
1 These authors use OECD data on product market regulations in OECD countries as well as the World Bank’s 





2 To the extent that more recent BITs have broadened the coverage of 
FDI-related issues and have become more binding, this reasoning implies that recent BITs 
may be more effective than older BITs in promoting FDI inflows. We address this issue in our 
robustness checks in Section 6. 
Apart  from  being  used  deliberately  as  a  commitment  device,  Elkins  et  al.  (2006) 
present a “competitive model” to explain why it is rational for a host country to expect higher 
FDI inflows through signing BITs. Host countries face a collective action problem once it is 
taken into account that the conclusion of BITs involves costs for them, e.g., by relegating 
adjudicative authority to foreign tribunals (sovereignty costs). Host countries may be better 
off when collectively resisting the demand of foreign investors for BITs. For the individual 
host country, however, it is rational to sign BITs in order to gain reputational advantage and 
thereby, divert FDI away from competing host countries.
3 Especially countries competing for 
similar  types  of  FDI  are  expected  to  sign  BITs,  in  order  not  to  place  themselves  at  a 
disadvantage (see also Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005). However, this line of reasoning not 
only applies to BITs but also to unilateral FDI liberalization.  
While previous empirical studies on the effects of BITs have largely in common that 
they do not account for unilateral FDI liberalization, their research design as well as the data 
used  and  the  sample  of  host  and  source  countries  differ  significantly.  Hence,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  empirical  findings  have  remained  highly  ambiguous.  Hallward-Driemeier 
(2003) is the only study that employs bilateral FDI flows for more than one source country, as 
we do in this paper.
4 She finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated FDI flows from 
OECD  countries  to  developing  host  countries.  However,  the  study  covers  just  31  host 
countries. While Hallward-Driemeier does not provide details on the sample, this is likely to 
bias results as minor hosts of FDI typically go unreported in published OECD statistics on 
FDI outflows. 
Neumayer and Spess (2005) suspect that the dyadic approach of Hallward-Driemeier 
underestimates the effects of  BITs on FDI,  and argue in favor of  a non-dyadic  approach 
instead, since published data on aggregate FDI flows from all sources are available for a much 
larger sample of host countries. Moreover, the non-dyadic approach may capture spillover 
                                                            
2 As noted by Vandevelde (1998), BITs generally cover issues of (i) access, (ii) non-discrimination, (iii) security, 
(iv) dispute settlement, and (v) transparency. But access provisions, for example, are often subordinate to local 
law,  and  non-discrimination  provisions  often  apply  only  after  an  FDI  project  has  been  approved  (post 
establishment). 
3 As discussed in more detail in Section 4, this argument leads us to consider the share of host country j in total 
FDI flows from source country i to be our preferred FDI measure when specifying the empirical model. 




effects that BITs with important source countries may have on FDI flows from other source 
countries. And indeed, Neumayer and Spess find that developing host countries which have 
agreed to a larger number of BITs have attracted higher FDI inflows. By contrast, Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman (2005: 23) conclude that “BITs do not seem to encourage FDI except at low 
levels of political risk”, even though their analysis, too, is non-dyadic. In particular, Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman reject the view that BITs are a substitute for a favorable local business 
environment, whereas Neumayer and Spess report some evidence to this effect.
5  
The striking differences between these two non-dyadic analyses may be partly because 
Neumayer and Spess cover a broader sample.
6 Yet it is open to debate whether the results of 
Neumayer and Spess are more reliable. Most importantly perhaps, results may depend on 
whether (and in which way) the possible endogeneity of BITs is taken into account.
7  
The gravity model results of Daude and Fratzscher (2006) provide further reason to 
carefully test for the robustness of empirical estimates on the impact of BITs on FDI inflows. 
Daude and Fratzscher focus on information frictions as determinants of (bilateral) FDI stocks 
(and other types of foreign capital), but include BITs as a control variable. The effect of BITs 
on FDI proves to be highly sensitive to the size of the sample.
8 The analysis of these authors 
is purely cross-sectional so that the effects BITs may have over time remain open to question. 
Yet, this study provides an important insight. In addition to their gravity model, Daude and 
Fratzscher assess various factors that may explain the host country fixed effects emerging 
from this model. Inter alia, they consider a dummy on capital account openness as well as 
institutional indicators related to investor protection (risk of expropriation, risk of repudiation 
and time of dispute settlement) as possible determinants of FDI. Even though FDI is found to 
be  relatively  insensitive  to  these  factors  across  host  countries,  especially  compared  to 
portfolio  investment,  their  analysis  stands  out  in  that  it  takes  account  of  the  bilateral 
dimension of FDI determinants and host country effects resulting from unilateral measures. 
 
3.  Stylized Facts on BITs and Unilateral FDI Liberalization 
                                                            
5 Similar to Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Hallward-Driemeier (2003: 22) concludes: “A BIT has not acted 
as a substitute for broader domestic reform.” Note, however, that none of the three studies employs FDI-specific 
regulations as a control variable which with the BITs variable is interacted, as we do in the following. 
6 Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) add another dimension to the debate. While the major part of their analysis is 
purely cross-sectional, it appears that BITs concluded by developing countries with the United States do lead to 
higher FDI inflows, whereas BITs concluded with other source countries do not. By contrast, Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) do not find that US FDI is directed to host countries that concluded BITs with the United 
States. 
7 See Section 4 on how we deal with endogeneity. 
8 The number of observations varies considerably depending on the specification of the model, i.e., the use of 




The conclusion of BITs and unilateral FDI liberalization developed in unison with each other. 
It is in both ways that host countries increasingly attempted to attract FDI inflows, notably 
since the early 1990s. As mentioned before, the number of BITs remained fairly limited until 
the late 1970s. The conclusion of BITs gathered considerable momentum during the last 15 
years when the number of BITs soared from about 400 to almost 2,500 at the end of 2005 
(Figure 1). This pattern suggests that the effects of BITs on FDI inflows may be concentrated 
in the more recent past. We test this proposition in Section 6 as one of our robustness checks. 
 

















Source: UNCTAD (2007b). 
 
Considering the contractual parties that have concluded BITs, Figure 2 reveals that 
developed countries are involved as a signatory in 60 percent of all BITs in force at the end of 
2005,  with  either  developing  countries  (39  percent),  transition  countries  (13  percent)  or 
another  developed  country  (8  percent)  representing  the  second  signatory.  Neumayer  and 
Spess  (2005:  1573)  argue  that  it  is  mainly  BITs  concluded  between  a  developed  and  a 
developing (or transition) country that can be expected to have significant effects on FDI 
flows from the former to the latter.  It should be noted, however, that various developing 
countries account for a rising share of worldwide FDI outflows. Taken together, developing 
source countries accounted for 12 percent of total outward FDI stocks in 2005 (UNCTAD, 
2006).
9  At  the  same  time,  an  increasing  number  of  BITs  have  been  concluded  among 
developing countries. Hence, it makes sense to account for developing countries as source 




for the robustness of our results by running separate estimates for developed and developing 
source countries. 
 








between developed and developing countries
between developing countries and those of South-East Europe and CIS
between developed countries
between developed countries and those of South-East europe and CIS
between countries of South-East Europe and CIS
Source: UNCTAD (2007b). 
 
Similar to the time pattern observed for BITs, unilateral capital account liberalization 
gathered momentum only in the 1990s. Figure 3 portrays the Chinn-Ito index on financial 
openness (Chinn and Ito 2005).
10 The index is based on several dummy variables, including 
the  presence  of  multiple  exchange  rates,  restrictions  on  capital  account  transactions  and 
requirements  to  surrender  export  proceeds.  Unilateral  liberalization  in  these  respects  can 
reasonably be expected to help attract higher FDI inflows. The index is calculated so that 
higher  index  values  indicate  greater  openness  to  cross-border  capital  transactions  (with  a 
mean of zero). 
Prior to 1990, unilateral capital account liberalization according to the Chinn-Ito index 
was largely confined to high-income OECD countries. By contrast, the 1990s witnessed a 
major change in capital account regulations by non-OECD countries, i.e., the host countries of 
FDI on which we focus in the following. Capital account liberalization in this broadly defined 
group  of  countries  continued  in  most  recent  years.  However,  recent  liberalization  was 
restricted  to  the  sub-group  of  middle-income  countries.  Unilateral  liberalization  was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




discontinued by the sub-group of low-income countries which, on average, still have much 
stricter capital account restrictions. 
Taken together, the short account of trends with respect to the conclusion of BITs and 
unilateral regulatory changes that may help attract FDI inflows strongly suggests accounting 
for both sets of policy measures when assessing the effectiveness of BITs. 
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Note: Country classification according to World Bank (2006); see text for explanation of the Chinn-Ito index on 
financial openness. 
Source: Chinn and Ito (2005). 
 
4.  Method and Data 
We follow large parts of the relevant literature  and estimate a  gravity-type model on the 
determinants of FDI. As noted by Deardorff (1998), this class of models first appeared in the 
empirical  literature  on  bilateral  trade  flows  without  much  serious  attempt  to  justify  them 
theoretically. However, Deardorff shows that even simple gravity models can be derived from 
standard  trade  theories.  More  recently,  gravity  models  have  also  been  applied  to  analyze 
bilateral FDI; prominent examples include: Shatz (2003), Mutti and Grubert (2004), Martin 
and Rey (2004), as well as Portes and Rey (2005).
11 It typically turns out that the gravity 
equations for financial flows are comparable in terms of explanatory power to those for trade 
flows (Martin and Rey 2004: 338). According to Portes and Rey (2005: 275), this is hardly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     




surprising as the gravity approach “emerges naturally” from theories of asset trade. At the 
same  time,  Shatz’  (2003)  analysis  of  US  FDI  reveals  that  sample  selection  matters  for 
empirical results.
12 
The basic specification of our gravity model reads as follows:
13 
 
(1)                                         ε λ BIT   α Y φ' X γ' α
FDI
FDI
ln  ijt t ijt 1 ijt jt 0
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where FDIijt stands for foreign direct investment of country i in country j at period t, FDIit for 
total FDI of country i in all (developing) countries included in our sample, Xjt represents a set 
of host country control variables, Yijt denotes the difference between source and host country 
characteristics,  λt  is  a  set  of  year  dummies,  and  BITijt  corresponds  to  a  ratified  bilateral 
investment treaty.  
We  follow  Hallward-Driemeier  (2003)  in  that  we  use  bilateral  FDI  flows.  We 
overcome the critique of Neumayer and Spess (2005) concerning the limited host country 
coverage of previous dyadic analyses by fully exploiting the (largely unpublished) data on 
bilateral  FDI  flows  available  upon  request  from  UNCTAD’s  Data  Extract  Service.  As 
discussed in Section 2, the dyadic approach may underestimate the impact of BITs if the host 
country, by concluding a BIT with one source country, signals to other source countries that 
their FDI will be protected in the same way. However, signaling effects cannot necessarily be 
attributed  to  BITs  once  it  is  taken  into  account  that  host  countries  have  followed  a  two-
pronged approach of unilateral FDI liberalization and bilateral commitments through BITs 
(Section 3). Any BIT-related signaling to third parties is no more credible than non-binding 
unilateral liberalization. Hence, we control for unilateral liberalization in our dyadic approach 
in order not to overestimate the effects of BITs on FDI inflows. 
As  concerns  the  dependent  variable,  our  preferred  measure  is  the  share  of  FDI 
attracted  by  a  specific  host  country  in  total  FDI  flows  from  the  source  country  under 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 However, none of these studies considers BITs to be a possible determinant of FDI. 
12  As  noted  by  Shatz  (2003: 118),  “national  statistical  agencies  publish  bilateral  data  about  the  investment 
activities of their multinationals only for host countries that have sizeable inflows of FDI. This means that nearly 
all research on foreign direct investment focuses on the winners, countries that have achieved at least some 
success in attracting FDI. This is a significant problem since policy advice is most often sought by the countries 
that are excluded from analysis.” 
13 In our empirical approach, we principally follow Carr et al. (2001), who estimate the so-called knowledge-
capital model that combines horizontal (market seeking) and vertical (efficiency seeking) FDI in a single model. 
We divert from the model by Carr et al. in that we use additional control variables to account for the impact of 
BITs on FDI. Moreover, to include as many countries as possible, we sometimes refer to slightly different 
control variables for which we could obtain data for a large number of developing countries. We do not include 




consideration to all developing host countries included in our sample. This measure captures 
the attractiveness of a particular developing country relatively to other developing countries.
14 
Moreover, this FDI measure clearly relates to the theoretical model of Elkins et al. (2006), 
according to which host countries sign BITs in order to divert FDI away from competing host 
countries. 
Since there is a large number of zero observations for FDI at a bilateral level, we 
consider two variants of the dependent variable, with (FDI1) or without zero observations 
(FDI2). It is highly likely that the missing data in our dataset are in fact zeros, since we 
consider FDI at a bilateral level for a long period of time. Hence, FDI1 includes missing 
values as zero observations even though there might be some unreported FDI figures due to 
confidentiality.  We  calculate  three-year  averages  in  order  to  smooth  the  considerable 
fluctuation of annual bilateral FDI flows. At the same time, this approach ensures that we 
have enough variation in the data. Negative FDI flows (for three-year averages) were set 
equal to zero to include as many observations as possible.
15 
We employ a fairly standard set of controls, including total real host country GDP and 
real  GDP  growth  for  market  seeking  FDI  (labeled  GDP  and  Growth,  respectively),  host 
country  inflation  (Inflation),  host  country  openness  to  trade  (Openness),  the  difference  in 
GDP per capita between the source and the host country for vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc), and a 
dummy for the existence of a bilateral or regional trading agreement, that is, a free trade 
agreement  or  customs  union  (RTA).
16  We  expect  a  positive  association  of  GDP,  Growth, 
DiffGDPpc,  and  RTA  with  FDI;  the  opposite  applies  to  Inflation,  as  this  variable  can  be 
interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic distortions.
17 
As  for  time  invariant  variables,  we  also  closely  follow  the  empirical  literature  on 
gravity  models  and  incorporate  dummies  for  a  common  border  (ComBorder),  common 
language (ComLang) and colonial ties (ColonTies), as well as the distance between the source 
and the host country (Distance). The first three control variables are expected to be positively 
associated  with  FDI  flows,  whereas  the  sign  of  Distance  is  unclear.  On  the  one  hand, 
management and transport costs are likely to increase if two countries are located far away 
                                                            
14 In addition to FDI shares, previous studies have used two further dependent variables: FDI inflows in US$ 
million and FDI as a share of GDP. While estimates for the latter are difficult to interpret due to the fact that 
GDP stands on both sides of the equation, the former may lead to biased estimates due to upward trends in both 
FDI and BITs over time. 
15 Importantly, the results hardly change if we exclude negative values. 
16 See Appendix A for exact definitions and data sources for all variables. 




from each other; on the other hand, remote markets might be better served through local 
production, that is, FDI in the host country. Hence, the net impact on FDI is uncertain. 
To reduce the skewness in the data, we take the natural logarithm of GDP, FDI1, 
FDI2, DiffGDPpc, Distance, and Inflation. To avoid the loss of observations for which we 
have negative values or zeros, for example for Inflation, we use the following logarithmic 
transformation: 
 
( ) ( ) (2)                                                  1 ln     x x   y
2 + + =  
 
Whereas the sign of x is unchanged, the values of x pass from a linear scale at small 
absolute values to a logarithmic scale at large values by using this transformation. 
Institutional  development  of  host  countries,  proxied  by  political  constraints  on  the 
executive  branch  (PolCon),  is  included  as  a  control  variable  as  poor  institutions  may 
discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty (e.g., with respect to the protection of property 
rights;  Lee  and  Mansfield  1996;  Henisz  2000)  and  additional  costs  (e.g.,  in  the  case  of 
corruption; Wei 2000). We use the index for political constraints that has been developed by 
Henisz (2000). In contrast to alternative institutional indicators, this variable is available for a 
large  number  of  countries  and  years.  PolCon  focuses  on  the  political  discretion  of  the 
executive branch. Less discretion is supposed to render credible commitments to (foreign) 
investors more likely. The indicator ranges from zero (total political discretion) to one (no 
political discretion). Thus, we expect a positive link between PolCon and FDI flows. 
In contrast to earlier studies, we also control for unilateral regulatory changes that may 
have an impact on FDI flows. We use the Chinn-Ito index measuring a country’s capital 
account openness as specified in Section 3 above (CapOpen).
18 Thus, the dyadic approach 
taken in this paper tends to mitigate the omitted variable bias as unilateral regulatory changes 
typically  apply  to  FDI  from  all  sources  in  the  same  way.  We  expect  a  positive  linkage 
between CapOpen and FDI flows. 
As  concerns  our  variable  of  principal  interest,  BIT  stands  for  a  ratified  bilateral 
investment treaty between the source and the host country. While we could have used the date 
of signing a BIT, we rather employ the date of ratification since only ratified BITs offer 
                                                            
18 The Chinn-Ito index is available for the period 1970-2004 and for more than 160 countries. Given its broad 
coverage over time and across countries, the Chinn-Ito index is clearly superior to other possible measures of 




protection to (foreign) investors.
19 Accordingly, the BIT variable represents a dummy taking 
the value of 1 when FDI flows from a specific source country to a specific host country were 
governed by a (ratified) BIT in a particular year. Since we use three-year averages for all 
variables, BIT takes the value of either 0, 0.33, 0.66, or 1. 
To check the robustness of our results, we use different estimation techniques: For a 
start, we ignore the potential endogeneity of BIT. First of all, we estimate a fixed-effects 
model, since a standard Hausman test indicated that this model is preferred in comparison to a 
random-effects model. We then estimate a Tobit model to account for the fact that the sample 
includes a large number of zero observations (FDI1); the Tobit model includes the above 
mentioned time-invariant variables. 
In the next step, we account for possible endogeneity. While ratifying a BIT could 
increase FDI flows to a developing country, we cannot rule out reverse causality. Above all, 
investors might press their government to ratify BITs with host countries in which they are 
heavily  engaged,  though  feeling  insecure  regarding,  for  example,  expropriation  or  the 
repatriation  of  profits.  Neumayer  and  Spess  (2005)  lag  BITs  by  one  period  to  mitigate 
potential  reverse  causality,  but  dismiss  instrumental  variable  (IV)  regressions  for  lack  of 
appropriate instruments. One period lags can be problematic, especially when using annual 
data as in Neumayer and Spess (2005). Hallward-Driemeier (2003) applies the number of 
BITs  a  host  country  has  concluded  with  third  countries  as  an  instrument  for  the  BITs 
concluded between particular pairs. This instrumentation is awkward if Neumayer and Spess 
(2005) are right in that BITs concluded with a particular source country have signaling effects 
and may, thus, be correlated with FDI from other sources, too. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005) use a time variable and the level of democracy in the host country as instruments. The 
reason given for this instrumentation is that, observing that more and more countries conclude 
BITs, a particular host country may feel the need to join this trend in order not to be left out. 
However, this argument rather suggests employing the number of BITs concluded by other 
host countries, and in particular by neighboring host countries, as an instrument for pairwise 
BITs concluded by the particular host country under consideration.  
Against  this  backdrop,  we  use  three  instruments  for  BIT:  (i)  the  number  of  BITs 
ratified by neighboring countries with the source country under consideration, divided by the 
number of neighbors (BIT_Neighbors); (ii) the difference between the  average number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
available for specific host countries. The World Economic Forum (2006) presents survey information on foreign 
ownership restrictions for 125 countries, but this information is not available over time. 
19 A few countries signed BITs but never ratified them; for example, Brazil was signatory of 14 non-ratified 




BITs  ratified  by  all  developing  countries  included  in  the  sample  (but  excluding  the  host 
country  under  consideration)  and  the  number  of  BITs  ratified  by  the  host  country  under 
consideration (BIT_Competitors); and (iii) the lagged level of the BIT variable (BIT_lagged). 
As for the instrumentation technique, we use a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) 
estimator to account for heteroskedasticity.  
Our  analysis  covers  the  period  1978-2004,  that  is,  nine  observations  of  three-year 
averages for all indicators. UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service provides FDI data since 1970, 
but very few countries report FDI flows for the 1970s at a bilateral level. To avoid any biases 
arising from an extremely small sample of reporting countries, we start with 1978. We include 
the  maximum  number  of  source  and  host  countries  for  which  bilateral  FDI  flows  are 
available, except financial offshore centers, such as Panama, The Bahamas, or the Cayman 
Islands.
20 However, as concerns the hosts of FDI, we follow previous studies and consider 
developing countries only. It is mainly for them that BITs may compensate for less developed 
local  institutions  and  can,  thus,  be  expected  to  promote  FDI  inflows.  At  the  same  time, 
extending the sample to include a large number of poor developing host countries is crucial to 
avoid a sample selection bias and to assess the chances of these countries to become more 
attractive to FDI. Our sample consists of 83 developing host countries, which is almost three 
times as large  as the sample used by  Hallward-Driemeier (2003).  By covering 28 source 
countries of FDI, including various non-OECD source countries, we at least partly capture the 
recent surge of FDI flows from developing countries to other developing countries.
21 
 
5.  Main Results 
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn to the 
empirical results. We start with the fixed-effects technique and focus, for a start, on FDI1 
(columns 1 to 4 in Table 1). In Model I, we include all relevant control variables except 
CapOpen, as the sample declines by some 330 observations if CapOpen is included (Model 
II). In contrast to market growth, the coefficient for the size of the host country market is 
positive and highly significant at the 1 per cent level (horizontal FDI). The same applies to the 
difference in GDP per capita between source and host countries (vertical FDI). The estimated 
coefficient of Inflation, on the other hand, has the expected negative sign (and is significant at 
the 5 per cent level). While openness to trade is not significantly associated with FDI inflows, 
                                                            
20 The FDI data for financial offshore centers are highly likely to be biased. We exclude all countries that are on 
the list of offshore financial centers as reported by Eurostat (2005). 




having a regional trade agreement with the source country is linked with higher FDI inflows. 
Likewise FDI inflows increase if institutions are better developed in the host country. Finally, 
the BIT variable has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 1 per cent level, meaning 
that having a BIT ratified with the source country is associated with an increase in FDI flows 
to the host country. 
The overall fit of the fixed-effects estimations is relatively low. It should be noted that 
FDI1 and FDI2 stand for relative shares in FDI inflows into developing countries and that we 
cover a fairly diverse sample of 28 source and 83 developing (host) countries.
22 Hence, a 
much better overall fit was hardly to be expected. In fact, our model fit is quite similar to 
those obtained by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005). 
In Model II, reported in column 2, we add CapOpen to control for unilateral capital 
account  liberalizations  by  host  countries.  The  coefficient  of  CapOpen  has  the  expected 
positive sign and reaches the 10 per cent significance level. While the BIT variable keeps the 
positive sign and the relatively high significance level, the size of the estimated coefficient is 
slightly lower, which is consistent with our expectations. As a consequence, by excluding 
unilateral measures of capital account liberalization we would overestimate the impact of 
BITs on FDI flows.  
Next  we  consider  the  possibility  that  the  impact  of  BITs  may  depend  on  major 
characteristics of the host country by including interaction terms of institutional development 
(PolCon) and capital account openness (CapOpen) with the BIT variable (Models III and IV). 
This allows us to test whether BITs might act as a complement or substitute for unilateral 
improvements in institutions and the degree of capital account openness. As can be seen from 
column 3, the interaction term PolCon*BIT is negative (and highly significant at the 1 per 
cent level), which suggests that BITs may act as a substitute for institutional quality of the 
host  country.  The  evidence  is  considerably  weaker  for  the  second  interaction  term, 
CapOpen*BIT;  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  is  also  negative,  but  falls  just  below  the 
conventional 10 per cent significance level. The BIT variable, on the other hand, is always 
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level.
23  
                                                            
22 Overall, our sample consists of 14,077 observations and 2,313 country pairs, that is, more than four times as 
many country pairs as used by Hallward-Driemeier (2003), who employed 537 pairs. 
23 Note the increase in the size of the coefficient for BIT from Models I and II to Model III. This is mainly due to 
the fact that we add the interaction term. To get the net impact of a ratification of a BIT, we would have to take 
the estimated coefficient for the interaction term into account too. The overall impact in this specification (and 
all other specifications in the following) is always positive and significant, which has been confirmed by an 




In the remaining four columns of Table 1, we report the results for the same model 
specifications,  except  that  we  use  FDI2  as  the  dependent  variable.  Note  the  considerable 
decline in both the number of observations (by more than 10,000) and the number of country 
pairs  (from  2,313  to  870).  While  this  substantial  drop  in  the  sample  affects  the  size  and 
significance level of the coefficients for a number of control variables, notably GDP, Growth, 
Inflation, RTA, and PolCon, BIT is always positive and significant at the 5 or 1 per cent level. 
Thus, even if we exclude the (large number of) zero observations for the dependent variable, 
the positive linkage between ratified BITs and FDI inflows still holds. Moreover, the size of 
the coefficients of FDI2 is somewhat larger compared to the corresponding coefficients of 
FDI1. This suggests that BITs help less in countries that appear to be totally unattractive (and, 






Table 1: Fixed-Effects Estimation Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable: ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2) 
Model: I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 
BIT  0.125***  0.104***  0.237***  0.112***  0.149**  0.130**  0.297***  0.134** 
  (4.07)  (3.26)  (4.41)  (3.37)  (2.20)  (1.91)  (2.59)  (1.92) 
ln (GDP)  0.200***  0.207***  0.200***  0.206***  0.162  0.122  0.105  0.122 
  (5.54)  (5.22)  (5.13)  (5.20)  (1.30)  (0.99)  (0.86)  (0.99) 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  0.0082***  0.0088***  0.0086***  0.0088***  0.0585**  0.0588**  0.0586**  0.0587** 
  (3.52)  (3.51)  (3.44)  (3.51)  (2.47)  (2.49)  (2.46)  (2.48) 
Growth  0.0010  0.00096  0.00083  0.0010  0.0159***  0.0154***  0.0149***  0.0154*** 
  (1.11)  (0.98)  (0.85)  (1.03)  (3.56)  (3.43)  (3.34)  (3.43) 
ln (Inflation)  -0.0075**  -0.0083**  -0.0094**  -0.0085**  -0.0183  -0.0185  -0.0209  -0.0184 
  (-2.05)  (-2.08)  (-2.38)  (-2.13)  (-1.30)  (-1.30)  (-1.46)  (-1.30) 
Openness  0.00030  0.00046  0.00050  0.00042  -0.0014  -0.00075  -0.00059  -0.00079 
  (0.94)  (1.34)  (1.45)  (1.24)  (-1.16)  (-0.60)  (-0.47)  (-0.63) 
RTA  0.206***  0.186***  0.196***  0.191***  0.0710  0.0618  0.0668  0.0650 
  (3.07)  (2.69)  (2.83)  (2.75)  (0.63)  (0.55)  (0.59)  (0.57) 
PolCon  0.111***  0.114***  0.170***  0.115***  0.0857  0.103  0.232*  0.104 
  (3.23)  (3.22)  (4.64)  (3.24)  (0.70)  (0.84)  (1.67)  (0.85) 
CapOpen    0.0109*  0.0113*  0.0152***    0.0432**  0.0431**  0.0479** 
    (1.89)  (1.95)  (2.65)    (2.09)  (2.08)  (2.05) 
PolCon * BIT      -0.391***        -0.475*   
      (-3.40)        (-1.95)   
CapOpen * BIT        -0.0247        -0.0134 
        (-1.56)        (-0.40) 
Observations  14,077  13,747  13,747  13,747  3,726  3,706  3,706  3,706 
Country pairs  2,313  2,313  2,313  2,313  870  869  869  869 
R
2 (within)  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03 
R
2 (between)  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.13  0.09  0.08  0.09 
Notes: t-values, reported in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity; due to space constraints, the coefficients for the year dummies are not shown; *** significant at 





Still, it can be argued that the inclusion of a large number of zeros in FDI1 might bias 
the  outcome,  since  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  might  not  be  the  appropriate  estimation 
technique for this sample. To account for this fact, we employ a Tobit model. By using this 
econometric  method,  we  are  also  able  to  include  various  time-invariant  indicators,  which 
might be important for bilateral FDI, but have been captured by the country fixed effects in 
the previous model. We use the same four model specifications (Models I to IV) as before, 
but focus on FDI1 only. As can be seen in Table 2, all previously used control variables have 
the expected sign and are significant at least at the 10 per cent level. The same applies to the 
four additional control variables. Having a common border, speaking the same language, and 
having colonial ties are positively associated with FDI flows. For the distance between two 
countries,  we  get  a  negative  coefficient.  Accordingly,  the  increase  in  management  and 
transport costs due to the distance between two countries is of higher importance than the 
attraction of investing in a remote market to serve that country through local production, 
namely through FDI.  
Importantly,  independent  of  the  model  specification,  BIT  is  always  positive  and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover, the two interaction terms maintain their negative 
coefficient, and both are now significant. This provides evidence that BITs might act as a 
substitute  for  institutional  quality  and  unilateral  capital  account  liberalization,  though  the 
interaction term CapOpen*BIT is not robust to different specifications. Overall, this finding 
corroborates the results reported by Neumayer and Spess (2005), who also find that BITs 
might act as a substitute for institutional quality.
24 In contrast, we do not support the results 
obtained by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Hallward-Driemeier (2003) according to 
whom BITs are only effective in stimulating FDI in countries with an already stable political 
and business environment. Again, we think that the sample selection bias of previous studies 
can explain these contrasting results.  
 
                                                            
24 Neumayer and Spess (2005) use several indicators for institutional quality and also find that the interaction 




Table 2: Tobit Estimation Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable: ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1) 
Model: I  II  III  IV 
BIT  0.140***  0.123***  0.236***  0.129*** 
  (7.12)  (6.08)  (7.12)  (6.34) 
ln (GDP)  0.181***  0.187***  0.185***  0.186*** 
  (25.4)  (25.7)  (25.4)  (25.6) 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  0.0115***  0.0125***  0.0124***  0.0125*** 
  (6.23)  (6.55)  (6.50)  (6.56) 
Growth  0.00188*  0.00195*  0.00182*  0.00199* 
  (1.87)  (1.91)  (1.79)  (1.95) 
ln (Inflation)  -0.0081**  -0.0077**  -0.0087**  -0.0079** 
  (-2.30)  (-2.10)  (-2.35)  (-2.14) 
Openness  0.00083***  0.00094***  0.00096***  0.00092*** 
  (3.52)  (3.86)  (3.96)  (3.77) 
RTA  0.221***  0.201***  0.216***  0.207*** 
  (6.77)  (6.04)  (6.47)  (6.19) 
ComBorder  1.081***  1.061***  1.059***  1.061*** 
  (11.0)  (10.7)  (10.7)  (10.7) 
ComLang  0.251***  0.249***  0.248***  0.249*** 
  (6.41)  (6.32)  (6.28)  (6.31) 
ln (Distance)  -0.168***  -0.178***  -0.177***  -0.176*** 
  (-9.87)  (-10.3)  (-10.3)  (-10.2) 
ColonTies  0.267***  0.269***  0.270***  0.269*** 
  (3.57)  (3.56)  (3.57)  (3.56) 
PolCon  0.0996***  0.0942***  0.148***  0.0968*** 
  (2.98)  (2.77)  (4.10)  (2.85) 
CapOpen    0.0146***  0.0153***  0.0193*** 
    (2.81)  (2.93)  (3.45) 
PolCon * BIT      -0.347***   
      (-4.31)   
CapOpen * BIT        -0.0254** 
        (-2.28) 
Observations  14,077  13,747  13,747  13,747 
Country pairs  2,313  2,313  2,313  2,313 
Notes: z-values are reported in parentheses; constant term not shown; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant 
at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 
So  far,  we  have  assumed  that  the  BIT  variable  is  exogenous.  As  noted  before, 
however, FDI may affect the ratification of BITs if foreign companies press for some sort of 
protection  of  their  capital  invested  abroad.  This  is  why  we  proceed  with  an  instrumental 
variable approach. We employ a standard GMM estimator to account for endogeneity of the 
BIT  variable.
25  While  we  instrument  BIT  with  three  indicated  variables  (BIT_lagged, 
BIT_Neighbors,  and  BIT_Competitors),  we  also  instrument  both  PolCon*BIT  and 
                                                            
25 Note that the dynamic GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) is not suitable for our BIT 
variable since this estimator uses first differences. We only instrument BIT (and its interaction with PolCon and 
CapOpen)  but  not  the  control  variables.  This  is  not  to  ignore  that  some  of  the  control  variables  may  be 
endogenous,  too.  For  instance,  FDI  may  affect  the  overall  trading  volume  if  foreign  companies  import 
intermediate goods and export processed goods. However, using a large number of instrumented variables at the 




CapOpen*BIT  with  interaction  terms  of  the  instruments  for  BIT  and  the  indicators  for 
political institutions and unilateral capital account liberalization. 
Importantly,  the  instruments  we  use  are  both  relevant  and  valid.  We  assess  the 
relevance of instruments by the magnitude of the R
2 in the first stage for each endogenous 
variable (BIT and its interaction with PolCon and CapOpen). The Shea first stage R
2 shows 
that the partial R
2 for changes in BIT is between 18 and 41 per cent in all estimations reported 
in Table 3, which is reasonable. While for the first interaction term (PolCon*BIT), the figures 
are  relatively  low,  they  are  considerably  better  for  the  second  interaction  term 
(CapOpen*BIT) for which the Shea first stage R
2 is in the range of 0.58 to 0.62, indicating a 
reasonably  good  fit.  Overall,  this  means  that  all  instruments  have  sufficient  relevance  in 
Shea’s sense. The validity of the instruments has been evaluated by using the Hansen J-test 
for  overidentifying  restrictions.  Our  IV  regressions  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the FDI equation. The results for the p-
value of the J-test for each IV specification show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
(instruments are uncorrelated with the error term) in all estimations. This result means that 
our instruments are affecting FDI but only through the BIT variable and, depending on the 
model specification, the interaction terms.  
Overall, we find that in all four models and for both FDI variables (FDI1 and FDI2), 
the  coefficient  of  the  BIT  variable  remains  positive  and  highly  significant.  The  GMM 
approach thus corroborates that ratifying a bilateral investment treaty with a source country 
leads to higher inflows of FDI from that country.
26 Note that the estimated coefficients of BIT 
are always larger in the instrumental regressions in comparison to the fixed-effects estimation. 
At first sight, this outcome might be surprising, since the presumed reverse causality in the 
latter approach would mean that we should obtain lower estimates in the GMM regressions. 
The fixed-effects estimates are determined by the association between FDI and BITs, while 
the GMM estimates are determined by the partial association between FDI and the component 
of BIT correlated with the instruments. Therefore, technically speaking, the fact that the fixed-
effects estimates are smaller means that the partial association of FDI with the instruments is 
weaker than its partial association with the component that is correlated.  
Arguably, this outcome is because the fixed-effects estimates are biased downwards 
(rather than upwards). If there is a signaling effect of BITs beyond the signatory parties, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
instruments for variables like Growth, as the lagged variable did not work out due to substantial fluctuations 
from one (three-year) period to another. 
26 For the interaction terms, we obtain the same outcome as in the fixed-effects estimation, that is, a negative 




speculated by Neumayer and Spess (2005), the BIT variable may underestimate the impact on 
FDI.  Consequently,  the  fixed-effects  estimates  would  understate  the  impact  of  BITs  on 
bilateral FDI inflows, whereas the GMM estimates do not suffer from this bias and are, thus, 





Table 3: GMM Estimation Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable: ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2) 
Model: I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 
BIT  0.209***  0.186***  0.587***  0.198***  0.396***  0.383***  0.821***  0.403*** 
  (4.19)  (3.56)  (4.95)  (3.61)  (3.26)  (3.14)  (3.28)  (3.21) 
ln (GDP)  0.174***  0.160***  0.167***  0.159***  0.202  0.163  0.155  0.160 
  (4.75)  (4.29)  (4.48)  (4.27)  (1.64)  (1.33)  (1.25)  (1.29) 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  0.00945***  0.0100***  0.0102***  0.00999***  0.0680***  0.0680***  0.0701***  0.0671*** 
  (3.72)  (3.65)  (3.55)  (3.65)  (2.83)  (2.84)  (2.90)  (2.80) 
Growth  0.00138  0.00134  0.000196  0.00139  0.0157***  0.0153***  0.0118***  0.0154*** 
  (1.44)  (1.35)  (0.19)  (1.41)  (3.53)  (3.43)  (2.60)  (3.43) 
ln (Inflation)  -0.00572  -0.00672*  -0.00834*  -0.00683*  -0.0107  -0.00925  -0.0138  -0.00966 
  (-1.50)  (-1.65)  (-1.96)  (-1.68)  (-0.74)  (-0.63)  (-0.90)  (-0.66) 
Openness  -0.000062  0.000087  0.00026  0.000056  -0.0015  -0.00094  -0.00053  -0.0010 
  (-0.19)  (0.25)  (0.74)  (0.16)  (-1.23)  (-0.75)  (-0.41)  (-0.81) 
RTA  0.161**  0.142**  0.144*  0.146**  0.0413  0.0387  0.0445  0.0442 
  (2.35)  (2.01)  (1.92)  (2.06)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.38)  (0.39) 
PolCon  0.0981***  0.104***  0.273***  0.105***  0.0813  0.101  0.453**  0.109 
  (2.79)  (2.88)  (4.79)  (2.93)  (0.66)  (0.82)  (2.10)  (0.88) 
CapOpen    0.00909  0.0124**  0.0130**    0.0409**  0.0437**  0.0504** 
    (1.54)  (2.10)  (2.16)    (1.98)  (2.12)  (2.04) 
PolCon * BIT      -1.159***        -1.290**   
      (-4.02)        (-2.06)   
CapOpen * BIT        -0.0229        -0.0299 
        (-1.15)        (-0.73) 
Shea partial R
2 (first-stage)                 
    BIT  0.41  0.40  0.22  0.40  0.32  0.32  0.18  0.31 
    PolCon * BIT      0.18        0.14   
    CapOpen * BIT        0.62        0.58 
Hansen J statistic (χ
2 p-value)  0.74  0.63  0.43  0.91  0.67  0.80  0.26  0.62 
Observations  13,585  13,288  13,288  13,288  3,539  3,521  3,521  3,521 
Country pairs  2,286  2,286  2,286  2,286  760  759  759  759 
Notes: z-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Instrumented variables: BIT and interaction terms; 





6.  Sensitivity Tests  
We  check  the  robustness  of  our  main  findings  by  using  several  additional  model 
specifications. In view of space constraints, we focus on the GMM regressions and report the 
coefficients for the BIT variable only.
27 First, we exclude RTA. Recall that we consider RTA 
to be a relevant control variable as regional trade agreements increasingly tend to include 
FDI-related prescriptions that, similar to BITs, promote FDI by reducing investor uncertainty. 
Hence,  the  isolated  impact  of  BITs  should  be  biased  upwards  if  RTAs  are  ignored.  This 
expectation turns out to be true. The coefficient of BIT, reported in Table 4, is typically larger 
when replicating the  estimations without RTA as a control variable, especially  when zero 
observations are taken into account (FDI1).
28 
Second, we exclude all transition countries. It can be argued that our results might be 
biased due to the inclusion of Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries since the 
countries have received much more FDI (or for the first time) after 1990 and, at the same 
time,  have  signed  various  BITs  with  developed  countries.  The  exclusion  of  transition 
countries results in smaller coefficients of BIT. In other words, BITs tend to more effective in 
transition countries. This may be partly because most transition countries belong to the group 
of middle-income host countries, for which BITs are more effective in promoting FDI (see 
below). In addition, the effects of BITs may be stronger in transition countries as many of 
them lacked any reputation concerning the credibility of unilateral measures immediately after 
the regime change. Still, for the remaining host countries in our sample, we obtain the same 
positive impact of BITs on FDI inflows, though the size and significance levels of the BIT 
coefficient are somewhat smaller. 
Third, the size of the BIT coefficient also becomes smaller when excluding resource-
intensive host countries. This is surprising since the availability of natural resources in host 
countries may provide such a strong incentive to foreign companies that they care less about 
protection of resource-seeking FDI. While our results suggest the opposite, they are subject to 
some qualifications. The data situation is far from perfect. The World Bank criterion we use 
for classifying resource-intensive host countries
29 is not available for various countries of our 
sample. This may  affect results especially because some countries in  which FDI is fairly 
                                                            
27 All GMM robustness checks reported in this section have been performed for the fixed-effects and Tobit 
models, too. As the sign and significance levels of the coefficients are quite similar, we do not report them. Like 
all other non-reported results, they can be obtained from the first author upon request. 
28 For reference, we show previous GMM estimates for the full sample in the first row of Table 4. 
29 We classify a country as resource-intensive if its resource rents, that is, energy plus mineral depletion in per 
cent of GNI, are higher than 15 per cent in the first three-year period (1978-1980). See the notes below Table 4 




likely to be resource-seeking could not be classified (e.g., Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, or 
Kazakhstan).  Moreover,  foreign  companies  are  most  likely  to  be  rather  lenient  about 
protection in the case of oil. However, many oil-exporting countries are not included in our 
sample of host countries, as the required data for the independent variables are not available. 
Fourth, we run separate estimations for low and middle-income host countries. The 
BIT  variable  retains  its  positive  impact  for  both  sub-groups.  The  effects  turn  out  to  be 
somewhat  stronger  for  middle-income  host  countries.  This  appears  to  be  reasonable,  as 
relatively advanced developing countries are better able to make use of FDI-specific assets, 
for example, by infringing on property rights. Hence, there is greater uncertainty for foreign 
companies  in  host  countries  with  higher  imitative  capacity.  The  link  between  credible 
protection through BITs and FDI inflows is therefore likely to be stronger than in countries 
with less imitative capacity. Yet, the interaction term PolCon*BIT is negative and significant 
for both sub-groups (not reported), which suggests that the substitution effect holds for both 
low- and middle-income countries.  
Fifth, the  essential picture remains the same  when our  estimations are  based on  a 
shorter  period  of  observation  (1990-2004,  instead  of  1978-2004).  For  our  first  dependent 
variable FDI1, the size of coefficients declines compared to the complete period, whereas for 
FDI2 we obtain the opposite outcome for all specifications but the first one. The results for 
FDI1 may come as a surprise, since one could have expected that more recent BITs were 
more effective in promoting FDI as the coverage of FDI-related issue became broader and 
more binding in the course of time. Interestingly, however, our results are similar to what 
Blonigen and Davies (2005) find with regard to bilateral tax treaties: While older tax treaties 
are positively associated with FDI, this does not apply to more recent tax treaties. There are 
several possible explanations why the effectiveness of BITs may have declined over time. 
Increasingly binding BITs may essentially mean that it becomes easier for foreign companies 
to remit profits and repatriate capital, which ceteris paribus would reduce net FDI inflows.
30 
On  the  other  hand,  BITs  may  suffer  from  diminishing  returns  due  to  their  proliferation 
(Nunnenkamp and Pant 2003; UNCTAD 1998). In contrast to earlier times, the conclusion of 
a BIT is no longer a distinctive factor signaling a particular host country’s readiness to offer 
favorable FDI conditions. Rather, foreign companies may increasingly tend to regard BITs as 
a standard feature of the institutional framework governing FDI worldwide. 
                                                            
30 In the context of tax treaties, Blonigen and Davies (2005) refer to concerns that such treaties arise due to 
lobbying efforts by profit-seeking investors. They conclude that treaties may then be geared towards maximizing 




Sixth, the separate estimations for developed and developing source countries support 
the view that BITs matter not only as a commitment device in developing countries’ relations 
with developed countries (see Section 3 above). Rather, BITs are also effective in stimulating 
FDI flows from developing countries to other developing countries. Our results even suggest 
that the effect of BITs may be underestimated if the analysis is restricted to FDI and BITs 
involving developed countries, as in previous empirical investigations.
31 
Finally,  we  run  separate  regressions  for  the  United  States  as  a  source  country  to 
compare our results with those obtained by previous studies. Like Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2005),  we  cannot  establish  any  clear  link  between  US  BITs  and  US  FDI  to  developing 
countries. We never obtain a statistically significant coefficient for BIT and the estimates 
fluctuate between positive and negative values. This outcome can partly be explained by the 
fact that the United States has not concluded a large number of BITs so far. As of 1 June 
2006, the US had ratified a total of 39 BITs (and 29 BITs with the 83 developing countries 
included in our sample), whereas Germany had concluded 114 (70) and the United Kingdom 
91 (57) (UNCTAD 2007a). This is even though US multinationals accounted for 19.2 per cent 
of total outward FDI stocks in 2005, much more than the corresponding figures for German 
(9.1 per cent) and British (11.6 per cent) multinationals (UNCTAD 2007b). Moreover, the US 
concluded  BITs  with  some  countries  mainly  for  political  reasons.  For  instance,  US 
commercial interest did not play a major role in Morocco and Jordan. The peculiar findings 
for the United States clearly reveal that it is important to include as many source countries as 
possible, as we do in this paper, to avoid any bias due to country specific effects and to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of BITs on FDI.
32 
In summary, our robustness checks strongly support our basic message that BITs help 
attract  FDI  from  different  groups  of  source  countries  to  developing  host  countries,  even 
though the size and significance level of coefficients differ somewhat across different sub-
samples of host and source countries. 
 
 
                                                            
31 Note, however, that developing source countries started from both virtual zero FDI (outflows) and no BITs 
concluded with other developing countries. The large BIT coefficients are, thus, not that surprising. 
32 We cannot repeat the regressions run by Hallward-Driemeier (2003), as she does not provide any information 




Table 4: Robustness Checks and Extensions, GMM Estimation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Dependent Variable: ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI1)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2)  ln (FDI2) 
Model: I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV 
Full Sample (as reported in Table 3)  0.209***  0.186***  0.587***  0.198***  0.396***  0.383***  0.8214***  0.402*** 
  (4.19)  (3.56)  (4.95)  (3.61)  (3.26)  (3.14)  (3.28)  (3.23) 
Excl. RTA  0.243***  0.216***  0.593***  0.227***  0.405***  0.391***  0.8206***  0.404*** 
  (5.06)  (4.30)  (5.03)  (4.25)  (3.37)  (3.25)  (3.28)  (3.21) 
Excl. Transition Countries  0.189*  0.181**  0.436***  0.148*  0.195*  0.197*  0.511**  0.200* 
  (1.63)  (2.04)  (3.88)  (1.65)  (1.62)  (1.64)  (2.21)  (1.67) 
Excl. Resource-intensive Countries
1  0.176***  0.170***  0.548***  0.174***  0.294**  0.294**  1.105***  0.356** 
  (3.44)  (3.10)  (4.75)  (3.11)  (2.14)  (2.12)  (3.38)  (2.47) 
Low-income Countries  0.178***  0.188**  0.349***  0.186***  0.320*  0.311*  0.503*  0.302* 
  (2.74)  (2.44)  (2.84)  (2.58)  (1.81)  (1.75)  (1.73)  (1.75) 
Middle-income Countries  0.235***  0.202***  0.784***  0.224***  0.399***  0.393***  0.994***  0.418*** 
  (3.72)  (3.13)  (4.38)  (3.12)  (2.68)  (2.65)  (2.71)  (2.67) 
Period 1990-2004  0.165***  0.164***  0.464***  0.168***  0.386**  0.393**  0.838**  0.459*** 
  (2.79)  (2.66)  (2.72)  (2.59)  (2.40)  (2.44)  (2.31)  (2.75) 
Developed Source Countries   0.196***  0.178***  0.479***  0.172***  0.314**  0.305**  0.731***  0.317** 
  (3.70)  (3.20)  (4.41)  (2.95)  (2.57)  (2.49)  (2.96)  (2.50) 
Developing Source Countries   0.313**  0.252*  1.939**  0.348**  1.269***  1.311***  2.519**  1.116** 
  (2.39)  (1.84)  (2.30)  (2.29)  (2.66)  (2.74)  (2.33)  (2.18) 
USA as Source Country  0.137  0.150  0.357  0.149  0.137  0.170  -0.018  0.160 
  (1.37)  (1.40)  (1.38)  (1.40)  (1.11)  (1.35)  (-0.05)  (1.26) 
Notes: To save space, we only report the results for the BIT variable; z-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant 
at 10% level. See Table 3 for further notes. 
1Algeria, Bolivia, China, Rep. of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Syrian Arab 







7.  Conclusions 
Policymakers in almost all developing countries are engaged in fierce competition for FDI. 
However, it has remained disputed how effective the means are that national policymakers 
have at their disposal when attempting to attract FDI inflows. In this paper, we focus on the 
impact  of  BITs  that  have  increasingly  been  concluded  in  order  to  reduce  uncertainty  of 
foreign investors in a credible way and, thus, to promote FDI flows to developing countries. 
Few  earlier  studies  have  addressed  the  effectiveness  of  BITs,  and  the  available 
empirical evidence is highly inconclusive. Depending on the particular study, we argue that 
previous evaluations of the effectiveness of BITs are distorted due to sample selection and 
omitted variable biases as well as the potential endogeneity of BITs in the regressions. We 
attempt to overcome these econometric concerns by covering a much larger sample of host 
and source countries, by accounting for unilateral FDI liberalization, and by including an 
appropriate instrumental variable approach. In contrast to most previous studies, our main 
finding is that BITs do promote FDI flows to developing countries. This result is fairly robust 
across various models. Moreover, the significantly positive effect of BITs on bilateral FDI 
flows applies to  FDI  from both developed  and developing source countries as well as to 
various sub-samples of developing host countries. Finally, we find that BITs may even act as 
a substitute for unilateral FDI-related liberalization measures and weak national institutions. 
All  this  suggests  that  policymakers  in  developing  countries  have  resorted  to  an 
effective means to promote FDI by concluding BITs. Nevertheless, our analysis leaves several 
questions for future research. For instance, it depends not only on the benefits in terms of 
higher FDI inflows but also on the costs involved whether ratifying still more BITs would be 
rational. Costs may arise by reducing the policy options host countries might want to consider 
in selecting FDI projects at the entry stage and in regulating approved FDI projects after 
entry.  In particular, it remains open to debate  whether host  countries  have reason to  feel 
unduly  constrained  given  that  recent  BITs  have  become  more  binding  and  broader  in 
coverage. Concerns are that recent BITs have shifted the balance towards the interests of 
profit  maximizing  foreign  investors  and  away  from  the  developmental  interests  of  host 
countries.  This  calls  for  a  detailed  evaluation  of  the  contents  of  BITs,  rather  than  only 
focusing on the number of BITs. 
Furthermore, future research may show that the effectiveness of BITs in the past may 
decline over time. For instance, if the trend of unilateral FDI liberalization continues and 
reversals  are  rare,  more  and  more  developing  countries  will  improve  their  reputation  of 




relevant. This could also happen due to the proliferation of BITs, with an ever increasing 
share  of  bilateral  FDI  covered  by  contractual  arrangements.  BITs  may  then  suffer  from 
diminishing returns and, in contrast to earlier times, would no longer be a distinctive factor 
signaling the host country’s readiness to protect foreign investors. Finally, the effectiveness of 
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Definition  Source 
FDI1  Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in % of total 
FDI to all developing countries included in our sample, 
including zeros 
UNCTAD (2007a) 
FDI2  Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in % of total 
FDI to all developing countries included in our sample, 
excluding zeros 
UNCTAD (2007a) 
GDP  Real GDP, constant 2000 US$  World Bank (2006) 
DiffGDPpc  Difference between source and host GDP per capita, constant 
2000 US$ 
World Bank (2006) 
Growth  Real GDP growth rate of host country in %  World Bank (2006) 
Inflation  Inflation rate of host country in % (GDP deflator)  World Bank (2006) 
Openness  Sum of imports and exports in % of GDP (host country)  World Bank (2006) 
BIT  Bilateral investment treaty, ratified between source and host 
country, 
UNCTAD (2007b) 
BIT_Neighbors  Number of BITs ratified by all neighboring countries, divided 
by number of neighboring countries  
UNCTAD (2007b) 
BIT_Competitors  Difference between average number of BITs ratified by all other 
(82) developing countries and number of BITs ratified by 
particular developing country 
UNCTAD (2007b) 
RTA  Dummy regional trade agreement, 0-1  WTO (2007) 
PolCon  Political constraints III, Henisz database, 0-1  Downloaded from 
Henisz’s homepage 
CapOpen  Indicator for capital account openness; Chinn-Ito index on 
financial openness 
Chinn and Ito (2005); 
data kindly provided 
by Hiro Ito 
ComBorder  Common border between source and host country  Dollar & Kraay 
dataset 
ComLang  Common language between source and host country  Dollar & Kraay 
dataset 
Distance  Distance in km between source and host country  Dollar & Kraay 
dataset 







Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
ln (FDI1)  14,077  0.30  0.83  0  5.30 
ln (FDI2)  3,726  1.13  1.28  0  5.30 
GDP  14,077  23.26  1.70  19.14  28.07 
ln (DiffGDPpc)  14,077  8.76  4.54  -10.15  11.21 
Growth  14,077  3.46  5.58  -18.20  77.70 
ln (Inflation)  14,077  3.02  1.66  -3.25  9.43 
Openness  14,077  73.10  39.86  9.31  245.80 
BIT  14,077  0.18  0.37  0  1 
BIT_Neighbors  14,077  0.12  0.26  0  1 
BIT_Competitors  14,077  0.10  11.89  -65.79  19.55 
RTA  14,077  0.05  0.21  0  1 
PolCon  14,077  0.25  0.20  0  0.68 
CapOpen  13,747  -0.22  1.33  -1.75  2.62 
ComBorder  14,077  0.01  0.12  0  1 
ComLang  14,077  0.11  0.31  0  1 
ln (Distance)  14,077  8.87  0.71  4.31  9.89 
ColonTies  14,077  0.03  0.16  0  1 
 
 
Appendix C: Source Country Sample 
Argentina,  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium-Luxembourg,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Denmark,  Finland, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  Turkey,  United  Kingdom,  United  States, 
Venezuela 
Note: Developing source countries in italics. 
 
 
Appendix D: Host Country Sample 
Albania,  Algeria,  Angola,  Argentina,  Azerbaijan,  Bangladesh,  Bolivia,  Botswana,  Brazil,  Bulgaria, 
Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  Republic  of  Congo,  Costa  Rica,  Côte  d'Ivoire, 
Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  El Salvador,  Equatorial  Guinea, 
Estonia,  Ethiopia,  Gambia,  Ghana,  Guatemala,  Guinea,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Hungary,  India, 
Indonesia,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Madagascar,  Malaysia,  Mali,  Mauritius, 
Mexico,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Oman,  Pakistan, 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Senegal, 
Seychelles, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Uganda,  Ukraine,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Vietnam,  Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
 